The Trident fiasco (see page 9) is just one further chapter in the
bulging encyclopedia of public sector procurement disasters. That's
sad enough in itself. What's sadder still is how the public at
large always blames the construction industry, regardless of the
rights or wrongs of the particular case. 'To build is to be
robbed,' Samuel Johnson once noted, and that perception has
remained the public's ever since.
Look at the recent list of construction calamities to hit the
national media. The British Library. The Chelsea and Westminster
Hospital. Prison overspends. And now Trident. All immensely
damaging to the image of builders, and almost entirely undeserved.
For what the national newspapers seem incapable of explaining is
that behind each of these cost explosions lie a series of client
miscalculations, parsimonious Treasury decisions or, to put it
bluntly, sheer commissioning cock-ups, that doomed the schemes from
the start.
Nor are the one-year-at-a-time budgeting constraints under which
this nation operates ever spotlighted. Yet for all the regularity
with which these purchasing lessons are forced upon the public
sector dunces, they never sink home.
It is no suprise, then, that the familiar scent of disaster is
already tickling the nostrils of those involved with the Channel
Tunnel fast-link. Senior contractors who have been close to the
Link for years have had their patience, not to say sanity, tested
severely on numerous occasions by the tortuous and snail-like
progress of this supremely important project. And even today, eight
years after the Tunnel was begun, things are no easier or clearer.
On the contrary, despite firm Government backing both for the Link
and the general principle of privately-funded projects, the
obstacles confronting contractors on the Link often appear
insurmountable.
At least one major contractor following the scheme is convinced
this has the makings of the mother of all disasters. He believes
the Government has drastically underestimated the risks inherent in
such a complex challenge. And, compounding matters, its insouciant
insistence on progressing with alacrity has conjured up visions of
a latterday Charge of the Light Brigade in more than one frustrated
contractor's mind.
Again, nothing new here. After dithering for years over whether a
Channel Tunnel was required, once its decision was reached, the
Government wanted it delivered at the drop of a hat. That breakneck
start sowed the seeds for much of the calamity that inevitably
followed. This time around, its amnesia is condemning it to repeat
all the previous mistakes. But when construction at last gets
underway, we all know who will be blamed for the inevitable delays.
A happy one, the contractor's lot is not.