The Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 provides as follows:
1.(1)...any person liable in respect of any damage suffered by
another person may recover contribution from any other person
liable in respect of the same damage... 1.(4) a person who has made
or agreed to make any payment in bona fide settlement or compromise
of any claim made against him in respect of any damage, shall be
entitled to recover contribution in accordance with this section
without regard to whether or not he himself is or ever was liable
in respect of the damage, provided however, that he would have been
liable assuming that the factual basis of the claim against him
could be established. 2.(1)...in any proceedings for contribution
under section 1 above, the amount of contribution recoverable from
any person shall be such as may be found by the court to be just
and equitable having regard to the extent of that person's
responsibility for the damage in question.
These provisions were closely examined in the recent case between
Sainsbury, Broadway Malyan and Ernest Green Partnership. Broadway
was the architect and Ernest Green the structural engineer engaged
by Sainsbury in connection with the construction of a supermarket
in Chichester in 1984.
In December 1993 the supermarket was destroyed by a fire. Sainsbury
claimed that the fire had spread to the sales area because Broadway
had failed in its design to provide sufficient fire protection to
the separating wall. Broadway in turn alleged in third party
proceedings against Ernest Green that the latter was also liable to
Sainsbury, as it had negligently failed to comment on Broadway's
drawing showing the design for the protection of the structural
steel work forming part of the wall.
Dealing with the question of liability, his Honour Judge Humphry
Lloyd considered that this had been advanced on three fronts.
Firstly, it was argued by Broadway that a lattice girder designed
by Ernest Green was an element of structure for the purposes of
Regulation E1(1) of the Building Regulations, and thus the
structural engineers should have known that the girder ought to
have been protected in order that it had two-hour fire
resistance.
Judge Lloyd held that the lattice girder, although structural in
nature, did not form part of the structural frame of the building
as a whole, but of the roof structure only and as such was not to
be defined as an element of structure for the purposes of
Regulation E1(1).
Whether or not that was a true analysis, Judge Lloyd held that in
any event a structural engineer would not be negligent in failing
to classify a girder of this type as falling within the
requirements of that Regulation.
Secondly it was argued that where the architect had changed the
construction of the compartment wall at the height of the roof
girder from blockwork to dry-lining, essentially at the request of
the structural engineer, the engineer should have recognised that
this rendered the girder a part of the compartment wall for the
purpose of the fire regulations.
Once again, Judge Lloyd held that it was not incumbent upon the
structural engineer to look at the architect's proposals to
determine whether a different treatment was now required for the
girder. The engineer was not in breach of its duties to Sainsbury
in not doing so.
Obligation
Finally, and of more general interest, Broadway argued that the
submission of the drawing to the structural engineer for comment
placed an obligation on the engineer to warn of any deficiencies in
regard to fire protection generally. Judge Lloyd considered that it
was significant that the drawing was not sent for "approval", and
that Broadway did not pursue Ernest Green for an answer on the
point which it was now being said was the reason why the drawing
was submitted.
He concluded that the transmission of the drawing for comment did
not place the structural engineer under any duty to Sainsbury to
consider the architect's design for the fire protection of the
girder. Accordingly, the claim for contribution from the structural
engineer was dismissed.
The matter might have ended there, but in order to introduce a
finality to the proceedings, Judge Lloyd went on to consider the
apportionment of liability which would exist in relation to the
structural engineer, in case his finding on contribution was
subsequently overturned.
He noted that in cases where a building inspector had been
negligent, the conventional approach was to attribute 75 per cent
responsibility to the builder and 25 per cent to the local
authority. Similarly, between an architect and a clerk of works,
the apportionment might be 80/20, on the basis that the clerk of
works was an inspector acting under the architect's direction and
control.
Judge Lloyd considered that the role of the structural engineer in
relation to the design of the fire protection of the compartment
wall could not be regarded as higher than that of a building
inspector or clerk of works. The structural engineer's negligence
was essentially a failure to warn. It was required by the architect
to comment, not to re-design. Given also that Broadway Malyan had
failed to be specific as to the comments it sought upon its drawing
and had failed to pursue the structural engineer for reply, this
would reduce the apportionment to 12.5 per cent to the structural
engineer and 87.5 per cent to the architect.