Most professionals in the construction industry understand the
concepts of termination and repudiation. It is appreciated that
these matters need to be approached with sensitivity and caution,
proper legal advice being crucial.
Nevertheless it is commonplace to find situations where the
termination of a construction contract has been poorly handled -
with a flurry of letters, faxes and e-mails blinding commercial
judgement.
The case of Bedfordshire County Council -v- Fitzpatrick Contractors
demonstrates how such actions may appear entirely unreasonable when
under the cold examination of a court of law. The proceedings arose
out of the termination of a highway maintenance contract awarded by
Bedfordshire County Council to Fitzpatrick.
The contract was for a period of four years, with work to be
carried out pursuant to works orders for the construction,
maintenance and clearance of all directly maintained highways in
Bedfordshire.
The contract envisaged the operation of the Transfer of
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981, to the
effect that there would an automatic transfer of the employment of
the Council's highways maintenance employees.
This meant that Fitzpatrick was concerned to ensure that the value
of work executed under the term contract would be sufficient to
keep the transferred workforce gainfully employed, otherwise it
could face substantial redundancy costs.
During the tender Fitzpatrick had requested the Council to confirm
the minimum contract value per annum and had been told that it
would be of the order of £6 million, although this figure
could not be guaranteed.
In February 1996 Fitzpatrick's tender was accepted and it was
agreed that the commencement date would be 1 June 1996.
orders
As June approached however, it became obvious to Fitzpatrick that
the anticipated volume of work orders would not be available to it
by 1 June. On 24 May it wrote to the council stating that it was
only in receipt of work orders for the first month of the contract
with a value of approximately £15,000. It noted that a spend
level in the order of £400,000 per month would be a minimum
requirement to maintain gainful employment for the transferring
employees.
A snowstorm of correspondence commenced. The council responded to
the effect that it considered there was no obligation upon it to
provide sufficient work to guarantee gainful employment for the
transferred workforce at the start of the contract.
The first of June passed without Fitzpatrick commencing work, and
the council immediately made provision for the continuation of
highway maintenance by employing the direct workforce that was to
have been transferred to Fitzpatrick.
Relations between the parties deteriorated further. On 11 June
Fitzpatrick wrote to the council stating that it considered that 1
July would be a more appropriate date for the contract to
commence.
The following day the council replied to the effect that unless
Fitzpatrick confirmed its intention to take up all its obligations
under the contract by 15 June, the council would treat this as a
repudiation and terminate the contract. On 13 June, not having
received an acceptable response from the contractor, the council
gave notice terminating the contract forthwith.
The Honourable Mr Justice Dyson QC was first asked to consider the
issues of liability.
Firstly Mr Dyson had to consider whether there was an implied term
of trust and confidence in a long-term contract of this type, in
similar terms to that which would exist between an employer and
employee.
This, it was argued, would apply to the effect that the contractor
would not conduct itself in a manner calculated or likely to
destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and
trust between the parties.
Mr Dyson was satisfied that no such term should be implied and that
the contract stood perfectly well on its own terms.
Turning to the actions of Fitzpatrick, it was clear that it was in
breach of contract by failing to accept the transfer of the
workforce and start work on 1 June. It was not a term of the
contract that there should be sufficient work available on 1 June
and even if there had been such a term, this would have given rise
to an entitlement to damages payable to Fitzpatrick. It would not
entitle Fitzpatrick to refuse to perform the contract.
breach
Such a breach of contract by Fitzpatrick did not however amount to
repudiation. The council was in no doubt that Fitzpatrick had the
will and the ability to perform this four-year contract.
Furthermore the council had failed to make "time of the essence" in
the contract by its letter of 12 June, since it had failed to give
Fitzpatrick reasonable notice.
In Mr Dyson's view the failure to commence work was not a breach
which would deprive the council of substantially the whole of the
benefit which it was intended that the council should obtain from
the further performance of the contract. It followed from this that
the council was in repudiation in terminating the contract on 13
June.