In March 2002, in the case of RJT Consulting Engineers -v- DM
Engineering, the Court of Appeal dealt with the important point of
whether oral contracts would be subject to the provisions of the
Construction Act. The Court held that all the terms, and not just
the existence of a construction contract, had to be evidenced in
writing if the contract was to be capable of being referred to
adjudication under the act.
In a dissenting judgement, Lord Justice Auld noted that, in his
opinion, what was important was that the terms of the agreement
material to the issues giving rise to the adjudication should be
clearly recorded in writing. In his view, it was not necessary that
every term, however trivial or unrelated to those issues, should be
expressly recorded or incorporated by reference.
Such issues concerning the jurisdiction of adjudicators remain
commonplace. It is often the case that challenges will be made to
the adjudicator at the beginning of the adjudication and the
adjudicator will have to decide, on the basis of those challenges,
whether or not to proceed with the adjudication.
It will be important for the parties to be clear that the
deliberations of the adjudicator at this point are merely
preliminary in nature. He simply decides whether it is appropriate
to continue with the adjudication and the matter of his
jurisdiction, if that continues to be challenged, will be decided
by the court at a later stage.
It is, however, possible for the parties to agree to confer upon
the adjudicator the necessary jurisdiction to deal with such a
question. Judge Dyson considered this matter in 1999 in the case of
The Project Consultancy -v- The Trustees of the Gray Trust. He
said: "If two people agree to submit a dispute to a third person,
then the parties agree to accept the award of that person, or
putting it another way, they confer jurisdiction on that person to
determine the dispute".
These matters have been reconsidered by the Court of Appeal in the
recent case of Thomas-Fredric's (Construction) -v- Keith Wilson.
Wilson was the principal shareholder of a company called Gowersand,
a company formed for the development of two dwellings on land at
the rear of Wilson's home near Sheffield.
In March 2001, Thomas-Fredric's undertook to carry out the
construction works. Following disputes, however, that agreement was
determined and a second agreement was made whereby, provided the
works were completed by a particular date, the further sum of
£35,000,would be paid. The agreement was evidenced by a letter
that Wilson had signed "on behalf of Gowersand".
Disputes continued and these led to Thomas-Fredric's commencing
adjudication. It named Wilson as the responding party. At the
outset, Wilson made representations to the adjudicator that he was
not the developer in the contract and that the correct party should
be Gowersand. He contended there could be no referral to
adjudication as the wrong party had been named in the notice of
adjudication.
The adjudicator called for submissions from both parties and
concluded that, in his opinion the contracting parties had been
correctly named in the notice of adjudication.
That being the case, he proceeded with the adjudication. In due
course he issued his decision directing Wilson to pay
Thomas-Fredric's various sums totalling about £12,000.
Wilson refused to pay, and the matter came before the court in May
of this year. Thomas-Fredric's successfully obtained summary
judgement on its claim. The judge had rejected Wilson's argument
that he was not the party to the contract and held that the
adjudicator had been correct in assuming jurisdiction to continue
with the adjudication.
The judge explained his decision on two footings. First, he held
that where the adjudicator had made his decision in respect of the
jurisdictional challenge, the court should follow it.
Second, even if he was wrong on that first point, he concluded that
the evidence all pointed one way, to the effect that the party to
the contract was indeed Wilson.
The matter then passed to the Court of Appeal. Lord Justice Simon
Brown stated he had the greatest difficulty with the conclusion of
the trial judge.
He noted that an adjudicator's jurisdiction under the 1996 Act only
arises under a construction contract in writing. Here, the only
agreement relied upon was that evidenced by the second agreement
letter. That letter had been expressly signed by Wilson on behalf
of Gowersand. Lord Justice Brown concluded that he could not find
within that letter any evidence, let alone clear evidence, to the
effect that Wilson, rather than Gowersand, was the contracting
party.
However, if Wilson had submitted to the adjudicator's jurisdiction,
in the full sense of having agreed not only that the adjudicator
should rule on the issue of jurisdiction, but also that he would
then be bound by that ruling, then the decision would be liable to
enforcement even if the adjudicator was plainly wrong on this
issue.
On the facts of the case, Lord Justice Brown concluded that in
simply making representations concerning jurisdiction, Wilson had
not submitted to the jurisdiction of the adjudicator in that full
sense.
In consequence the appeal was allowed. The earlier summ-
ary judgment in favour of Thomas-Fredric's was set aside.